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Shire + Baxalta 
New global leadership in the rare disease sector? 
On the 10th of July 2015, the summer day had begun with rain in the Irish capital, something that really 
irritated Flemming Ørnskov, CEO of Shire Plc, even though he had already gotten used to the characteristic 
climate of this city. But the day was too important to spend any time or energy with the weather conditions, 
it was the day to make an offer to acquire Baxalta, the big American biopharmaceutical company, and 
Ørnskov was confident the two firms could come to an agreement that would benefit them both. The CEO 
of Shire stated that: 
"We believe the proposed combination of Shire and Baxalta would be strategically and 
financially attractive for both of our companies, accelerating our respective growth ambitions 
and creating the leading global biotech company in rare diseases. The combined entity would 
have the opportunity to create significant shareholder value in one of the most attractive and 
fastest growing segments in healthcare. Together, the companies would be projected to 
deliver $20 billion in product sales by 2020, with the financial and operational firepower to 
fuel further innovation and growth in rare diseases. It is our strong preference to immediately 
enter into a negotiated transaction to explore the full potential of the proposed combination 
and finalize the terms of an agreement.”1 
The Irish firm had a big interest on Baxalta for its marketed and in-development products, because the firm 
was investing in areas like oncology (which the forecast indicated as the therapy area with the biggest 
market share in 2020) but above all, because their alliance would result in the “leading global biotech 
company in rare diseases”. Moreover, the growth of the combined company was expected to be greater than 
the growth of the companies by themselves. 
The aim of the management of Shire was to complete a takeover of the American company but, to achieve 
that, the Board of Directors of Baxalta would need to accept the terms of the offer. The proposal made in 
private on the 10th of July was for an all-stock transaction, giving to Baxalta’s shareholders 0,1687 Shire 
ADSs (American Depositary Shares) for each Baxalta share, implying a value of $45,23 per share. This 
offer was publicly rejected by Baxalta on the 4th of August of the same year, with the argument that the 
offer “significantly undervalues” the company and its potential. 
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Time has passed and 2016 arrived, but Shire’s management is still looking for the best thing to do 
concerning the failed attempted acquisition. Should they look for another company in the rare disease sector 
and give up on Baxalta? Or should they place another offer with a higher bid or even with different payment 
methods? At this point in time, Flemming Ørnskov is losing hope and starting to think this deal might never 
be completed… 
The Worldwide Pharmaceutical Industry 
The Pharmaceutical industry involves the different stages of development, production and marketing of the 
pharmaceuticals to be used as medication. This industry overlaps with the biotechnology industry in some 
aspects, and they both are constantly changing due to the fast development of new technologies and growing 
knowledge of the microorganisms and diseases which their products are intending to treat. The first records 
of products within this industry are of medical preparations from minerals, plants and animals which were 
used by apothecaries to treat general symptoms. Over time it has evolved tremendously and it’s now 
possible to chemically synthesize drugs that target specific strains of pathogenic organisms which need to 
go through complex testing processes that assure the safety of such products. 
The pharma industry has two large and distinctive markets which differ in the requisites needed to acquire 
medicines: Prescription drugs and over-the-counter drugs. Prescription drugs can only be sold in 
pharmacies or authorized facilities and their purchase requires a prescription authenticated by a doctor. 
Instead, over-the-counter drugs (OTCs) are considered safe for self-diagnosis and self-medication and can 
therefore be purchased in a larger variety of places without the need of any prescription.  
Moreover, the pharmaceutics in the market may be of two kinds: (1) innovative pharmaceuticals, which are 
exclusive of a certain laboratory and are patented, or (2) generic pharmaceuticals, that may be classified as 
commodity generics, if they are sold under the name of the active pharmaceutical ingredient with no 
association to a specified brand, or branded generics, if they are sold under a specific brand name. Generics 
appear after the patent period of the innovative drug expires, and these can be sold at a much lower price 
(around 80% less) because the costs associated with their development and production are also much lower. 
In 2014, in the U.S., the generics only accounted for 28% of total drug costs, even though they account for 
88% (9 out of 10) of prescribed drugs. The sale of prescribed generics can save billions of dollars to the 
health care systems but, in contrast, it destroys a huge amount of value in the pharma industry, as the 
products have the same therapeutic effects but generate only a very small fraction of the revenues generated 
by the originals. 
New Drug Development Process with FDA Approval2 
The process that an investigator needs to go through to have a new pharmaceutical in the market is very 
slow, costly and risky. It consists of five major steps which need to be sequentially overcame. The process 
begins with the Discovery & Development of the product, and is then followed by the Preclinical Research. 
The Clinical Research is the third step and is the phase that initiates the compatibility and effectiveness 
studies with humans, so that the treatment can be reviewed by the FDA and, if approved, marketed. Finally, 
after the treatment is available in the market, the last step is the FDA Post-Market Safety Monitoring, during 
which the product can be taken out of the market for safety reasons. 
Only after going through this incredibly thorough process – process in detail in Exhibit 1 - the drugs can be 
safely marketed, which reduces the number of new drugs marketed per year to only a few tens out of the 
thousands of candidates.   
The average cost associated to the development of a successful drug from scratch (considering the failed 
tries) is 2,6 billions of dollars. This very important factor is leading the market to change in the sense that 
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large companies are outsourcing parts of the drug development process to specialized research and 
manufacturers firms as a way to reduce the costs in R&D and mitigate some of the risk associated to the 
process. 
Patents 
Patents are granted as a way to protect intellectual property and have the duration of 20 years. These allow 
the investigators to develop, test and sell a new drug without the need to disclose their methods, preventing 
the possibility of drug replication by a competitor. Given that the process of developing and testing a new 
medicine usually takes between 10 and 15 years, the company is granted 5 to 10 years of exclusiveness in 
the market before the generics with the same active pharmaceutical ingredient as the product under the 
patent can be launched. This is an essential advantage in this business because every month without 
competition, allows the firm to recover a big portion of its investments with high sales of the exclusive 
drug. When the competition enters the market, the sales of such product decrease abruptly, losing up to 
80%-90% share of the sales with that medicine. The expiration of the patents and consequent decrease in 
the company’s profits, prevents them to invest aggressively in investigation and creation of new medicines 
due to the scarcity of capital, forcing them to raise money to finance R&D expenses in the financial markets, 
keeping these expenses to a minimal, which conditions the research.  
In the past few years, the phenomenon known as “Patent Cliff”, which refers to the expiration of a large 
number of patents and consequent drop in sales has been changing the industry entirely. In an attempt to 
protect themselves from the effects of the next patent cliff, the big pharma companies are transforming their 
way of investing in new products. They are shifting from a strategy of investing strongly in a small number 
of blockbuster drugs, to one that diversifies the portfolio with a larger number of specialized drugs in 
smaller volumes. One of the best ways to reach that is to focus the resources of the company in the fields 
where it already has expertise and acquire or merge with companies that are already specialists in the new 
areas of interest, retaining their know-how and expanding to markets with high growth potential. This way, 
the risk and the waste are reduced to a minimum and the company’s growth is maximized. 
The major players of the pharmaceutical industry in 2014 were the giants Johnson & Johnson, Novartis, 
Roche, Pfizer and Sanofi. According to the World Health Organization, the top ten pharma companies, 
account for more than a third of the total market, which indicates that the market is highly consolidated. 
This meant that, if a company didn’t grow enough or didn’t get as competitive as needed, it would probably 
be the target of a bigger and more competitive company that wanted to enter a certain area. Indeed, the 
existing biotech bubble has been resulting in the investment of huge amounts of money in speculative 
companies with no track record by the big pharma companies, allowing the biotech stocks to rise faster than 
any other sector in the US market, for the last four years. 
The global pharmaceutical market is expected to grow % and reach the value of Y by 2020, with the 
prescription drug sales alone, expected to grow from approximately $750 billion in 2014 to a value close 
to $1 trillion by 2020 (CAGR: 4.8% between 2014 and 2020). 
Therapeutic Areas 
The entire industry is subdivided in smaller markets referred to as therapeutic areas, amongst which are 
oncology, immunosuppressants, vaccines, and many others. A study released3 in June 2015 by 
EvaluatePharma®, indicates that the three therapy areas with the highest worldwide market share in 2014 
were Oncology (10,1%), Anti-rheumatics (6,2%) and Anti-virals (5,5%), corresponding to sales of $79,2bn, 
$48,8bn and $43,1bn respectively. The forecast for 2020 does not show big changes regarding the 
importance within therapeutic areas, with Oncology strengthening its position and reaching 14,9% market 
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share, with a +4,7pp change, and with the fall of Anti-rheumatics (5,2%) and Anti-virals (4,8%), allowing 
the climb of the Anti-diabetics area to second place with a market share of 5,9%. Exhibits 2 to 4 show the 
top 10 therapy areas in 2014 and 2020, their worldwide market share and sales growth. 
Shire Plc 
Shire Plc, headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, is a biopharmaceutical company founded in 1986 by Dennis 
Stephens, Geoff Hall, Harry Stratford and Peter Moriarty. The firm was founded in the UK, with its focus 
on some unmet medical needs and their possible solutions. 
The first products Shire placed in the market were related to the prevention of osteoporosis, a disease that 
weakens the bones but, in the mid-90, the company started a series of strategic acquisitions that would 
allow them to enter new areas and develop their clinical pipeline. The first acquisitions, in 1997, were of 
Pharmavene and Richwood Pharmaceutical Company, later in the same year. In the years that followed, 
Shire kept on acquiring smaller companies at a slow pace but, from 2010 onwards, the pace of the 
acquisitions increased substantially and, since 2010 around $18 billion were spend with the completion of 
11 deals to ensure the ownership of products already in the market, and compounds in clinical development, 
as the company tried to keep on growing in this competitive industry. 
Meanwhile, in 2014, AbbVie Pharmaceuticals attempted to takeover Shire. On 20 June 2014, Shire rejected 
an attempt to acquire the company for $46,5 billion – equivalent to £46,11 per share -  and on 8 July, the 
offer was increased to $51,5 billion. On 18 July, is was announced that AbbVie would acquire Shire for 
$54,8 billion, but the deal did not happen due to changes on the US “Tax Inversion” law, which made the 
board of directors of the acquiring company to lead the shareholders to vote against the deal. This made 
Shire’s share price to fall abruptly (in October - Exhibit 5a)) and the cancellation of the deal subjected 
AbbVie to the payment of a break up fee in the amount of $1,6 billion, to Shire. The failure of this 
transaction allowed Shire to continue its growth through the acquisition of other firms. 
Nowadays, the company has established a leading position in the rare disease market and is now the 30th 
largest pharma company in the world by sales, with $6,1 billion in sales – from which around 70% are of 
drugs protected by patents (Exhibit 6) - and $884,1 million in R&D expenses (financial statements and 
balance sheet can been seen in Exhibits 7 and 8). The market capitalization of Shire is $50,76 billion and 
its biggest areas of focus are Neurosciences, HAE.  
The firm had established itself in the market over time and is a constituent of both the FTSE 100 and 
NASDAQ-100 Indexes. 
Baxalta Incorporated 
Baxalta Incorporated is an American biopharmaceutical company listed in the NYSE that develops, 
manufactures, and markets innovative biopharmaceuticals in the areas of hematology, immunology and 
oncology worldwide. It was created on the 1st of July 2015 as a result of a spinoff of the biosciences division 
of Baxter International, which would focus on lifesaving medical products. Baxter took this action with the 
intent of divesting the business segments that carried more risk, as a way of streamlining its operations into 
a leaner organization. Baxter’s shareholders received one share of Baxalta for every Baxter’s share owned, 
with Baxter keeping 19,5% of Baxalta and receiving $4 billion of special dividends after the spinoff. Baxter 
aims to use the funds earned in the separation to repay pension liabilities and debt obligations. The 
separation was expected to benefit both companies with enhance of financial flexibility and reduction of 
complexity, resulting in strong balance sheets and cash flows.  
Before the spin off, Baxalta had already acquired SuppreMol, a German company focused on the early-
stage development portfolio of biologic immunoregulatory therapeutics for autoimmune diseases, and 
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Oncaspar, a blockbuster leukemia drug Sigma-Tau Finanziaria S.p.A., as well as a couple of other 
companies. 
In the FY 2015 the company earned $6,2billion in sales, of which 53% were originated in the US, and the 
remaining in the international markets. Regarding therapy areas, Hematology is the leader within Baxalta, 
accounting for 59% of the year’s sales - $2,840million in hemophilia and $787million in inhibitor therapies. 
The details of the FY 2015 are in Exhibit 9.  
Hematology 
Baxalta is the market leader in hematology with a 30% market share and, within this therapy area, with 
~50% market share, it dominates the growing hemophilia market offering the broadest range of hemophilia 
drugs. The hemophilia portfolio of the pharmaceutical includes Advate, Adynovate, Recombinate, and 
Rixubis as well as plasma-derived products such as factor VII, factor VIII, and factor IX. Still in this therapy 
area, Baxalta also produces inhibitor therapies, which was the third largest product category of the year. 
59% of the firm’s revenues were generated from hematology drugs and, even though the company 
maintains the leadership in this market, its biggest competitors Biogen, Pfizer, Bayer and Novo Nordisk 
(NVO) have been gaining some market share. 
The hemophilia market is a competitive one due to the premium pricing that is charged for innovative drugs. 
This premium is charged because of the rareness of the disease being treated, and attracts new competitors 
to come up with new therapies for this condition. It is valued in $6-8 billion in terms of sales and Biogen, 
Roche and BioMarin are some of the companies know to be investing to be competitive in this market, with 
solutions that may threaten Baxalta’s market share.  
Immunology 
This is the second largest sector of Baxalta following hematology and it is constituted by immunoglobulin 
therapies and biotherapies. It accounts for approximately 40% of the company’s net sales and it is focused 
on immunoglobulin therapies. The marketed drugs on this therapy area are products such as Gammagard 
liquid, Subcuvia, and Hyqvia or biotherapies albumin and alpha-1 antitrypsin. 
This segment reflected an annual growth of 9% in the company. The big firms competing in this area are 
Pfizer, Merck & Co., and Amgen. 
Oncology 
The smallest area of Baxalta, but a very promising one in oncology. The only oncology drug on the firm’s 
portfolio is Oncaspar, which was only acquired in 2015. The drug is marketed in 31 countries and Baxalta 
forecasts its sales could reach approximately $1,9 billion by 2020. Furthermore, the company has 
announced its partnership with Merrimack in the development of the metastatic pancreatic cancer treatment 
ONIVYDETM, and its eventual success will enrich the firm’s oncology portfolio. 
The oncology market is expected to grow immensely in the next few year, which makes it a very attractive 
market to invest in. 
The Deal 
Shire was a big company and had already completed a number of mergers and acquisitions to get to where 
it was. But the truth was that none of those could compare to the acquisition they were aiming for this time. 
The takeover of Baxalta would be bigger than all the other deals they’d ever done together and probably 
one of the biggest takeovers of the year across all sectors. 
According to the Chairman of Shire’s Board Susan Kilsby:  
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"Our Board unanimously supports this combination with Baxalta. Following thorough 
analysis and discussion, our Board concluded that this proposed transaction will deliver 
significant value for shareholders. We urge Baxalta to engage with us to create a stronger 
combined company that will benefit all of our stakeholders."4 
The offer “to acquire all of the outstanding common shares of Baxalta in an all-stock transaction”, made on 
July 10, 2015 had been declined on August 4, 2015, as the Illinois-based company’s CEO considered the 
offer to undervalue the firm and said it was too soon for the company to be acquired. The offer stated 
Baxalta’s shareholders were to receive 0,1687 Shire ADSs (American depositary shares) for each Baxalta 
share owned, which implied a payment of $45,23 per share of Baxalta and a premium of 36% over its price 
as of the 3rd of August. The proposed deal was for an all-stock transaction to maintain the tax-free nature 
of the spinoff. The values of the transaction also implied a total enterprise value of $33,9 billion and a 15x 
multiple of last twelve months EBITDA as of March 31, 2015, which were very attractive numbers in the 
Shire CEO’s opinion. If this deal had been completed, Baxalta’s shareholders would have become owners 
of approximately 37% of the Shire group, and a share buy-back program would have begun immediately 
after the acquisition to repurchase up to 13% of the post-transaction shares outstanding, within the next two 
years, as a way to increase the earnings accretion of the deal, maintaining financial flexibility and an 
investment-grade credit profile. 
The failed deal had consequences on both companies’ stock values, with Shire falling 5,3% to $253,60 and, 
contrary to that, Baxalta’s jumping 11,9% to $37,11. 
New global leader in rare diseases with compelling financials and strong outlook  
In case Shire manages to persuade Baxalta into a deal, it is expected that the combined company reaches 
~$20 billion in product sales by 2020, a billion dollar rare disease franchise business with substantial 
barriers to entry, and that both companies complement each other in terms of their expertise in rare diseases 
R&D, commercial and manufacturing, supported by global scale and infrastructure. This combination 
would generate thus, the new global leader in rare diseases. 
The new leader would have a compelling financial profile and would create value for both companies, as it 
is projected double-digit top-line growth for the firm, there is a substantial amount of operating synergies 
to be exploited and accretion to Non GAAP earnings, breakeven in year one and sustainable returns 
including IRR in excess of 10% are expected. 
Moreover, Shire planned more than 30 new product launches with ~$5 billion incremental sales potential 
by 2020 and a strong balance sheet and robust pro forma cash flow that will support future organic and 
inorganic growth, showing a bright future outlook for the firm. An increase with this value is very 
substantial considering Shire’s and Baxalta’s sales in FY 2015 were of $6,1 billion (increment of 80% for 
the companies individually and 40% for the combined company). 
From August 2015 to January 2016 
Since the rejection of the offer, Shire has been trying to negotiate with Baxalta to understand if an agreement 
between both companies would be possible, and if it was, which would be the value and form of payment 
to Baxalta's shareholders. Through the entire 5 months, Shire always made clear to everyone its view that 
the combination with Baxalta would benefit both companies, that the deal was still possible and that Shire 
would be “patient but disciplined” when handling the deal. 
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During the months between August and January, both Shire and Baxalta moved on with their operations 
and strategic agreements with different companies, whether it was with suppliers, as the extension of the 
agreement of Kamada supplying GLASSIA® to Baxalta until 2018 announced in October, or even the 
acquisition of new smaller companies as Shire did to Dyax Corp. for its hereditary angioedema (HAE) 
products, in a deal that amounted to a value up to $6,5 billion that occurred in the beginning of November 
and in which Shire paid $37,30 for each Dyax share upfront (implied premium of 37% over the closing 
price of 30 October 2015 – total of $5,9 billion) and with the possibility of paying an extra $4 per share if 
the HAE drug gets approved by the FDA before 2020 (total of $646 million). 
The two global biopharmaceuticals exceeded the estimates for the 3Q reports. Sales and profits were 
boosted by new approvals for drugs with exclusivity in the market and/or higher prices: Shire benefited 
from the recent approval of Vyvanse, a drug for ADHD’s treatment, and kept working on Lifitegrast, an 
ophthalmic solution for dry eye disease under regulatory approval, with expected sales of $700 million by 
2020. Meanwhile, Baxalta announced the approval of OZIBUR in Canada and Adynovate in the U.S,, for 
the treatment of patients with acquired hemophilia A as of October and November respectively, and of 
Vovendi (for Von Willebrand disease) in December, the initiation of the pivotal clinical trial for M923 
(biosimilar version of Humira), of the first in-human clinical trial of BAX 826 (for hemophilia), and the 
enrolment of the first patient in phase 2 study of ONIVYDE (for metastatic pancreatic adenocarcinoma). 
Baxalta also expanded their facilities, with the announcement of FDA approval of the Singapore facilities 
to enhance the reliability of the company as a supplier, and the opening of Global Innovation Center in 
Cambridge, Mass., dedicated to pioneering breakthroughs for patients with unmet needs. 
In November, news came out that, according to Reuters, Shire was preparing a new offer including up to 
40% of the payment in cash, to sweeten the deal for Baxalta, expecting it not to trigger any tax penalties in 
the bid. And in December, Barclays still stated that an offer from Shire up to $55 per share of Baxalta would 
make sense but, despite the absence of public offers, Baxalta was said to be looking for alternatives to Shire, 
wanting to make sure there were no best offers in the market.  
Final Decision 
2016 had arrived and 5 months had gone by since Baxalta had rejected Shire’s offer, and they still hadn’t 
been able to get to an agreement regarding the takeover. Should Ørnskov start looking for another company 
with characteristics similar to Baxalta? Should he raise the value of the offer? Should he turn it into a cash 
and stock offer? Time was running up and Ørnskov was determined to end the negotiations of this deal. 
Confident that he would accomplish what he desired, Flemming and his team met to decide what to do with 
relation to the Baxalta’s deal. 
  
 




Exhibit 1 - New Drug Development Detailed Process with FDA Approval 
 Step 1 – Discovery and Development  
o Identification and development of a promising compound 
 Step 2 – Preclinical Research 
o Before testing the new drug on people, researchers need to conduct in vivo and in vitro tests to 
understand if the product has the potential to cause serious harm on the patients (toxicity) 
 Step 3 – Clinical Research 
o In the clinical trials, the new product is tested on people and its interaction with the human body is 
studied. There are 4 phases of clinical trials, each one with a specific purpose: 
 Phase I: Testing on healthy volunteers for dose-ranging and safety, with a success rate 
around 70%;  
 Phase II: Testing on patients to assess efficacy and side effects, with a success rate around 
33%;  
 Phase III: Testing on patients to assess efficacy, efficiency and monitoring of adverse 
reactions, with a success rate around 25-30% 
 Phase IV: Checking the efficacy and safety of the drug on a large number of volunteers 
who have the disease 
 Step 4 – FDA Review 
o If there is evidence that the drug is safe and effective, an application to market it can be filed, seeking 
the approval of the FDA 
 Step 5 – FDA Post-Market Safety Monitoring 
o Even though a new drug may seem safe in light of all the tests it has been subjected to, the months 
and even years after the product is on the market are very important to confirm if it is indeed safe. 
During this time, the FDA monitors the drug and may add cautions to dosage and usage information 
Source: “Learn About Drug and Device Approvals” – U.S. FDA 
 
Exhibit 2 - Top 10 Therapy Sales in 2014, Market Share & Sales Growth (2013-2014) by 
EvaluatePharma® 
 
Source: “World Preview 2015, Outlook to 2020” - EvaluatePharma® 
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Exhibit 3 - Top 10 Therapy Areas in 2020, Market Share & Sales Growth by EvaluatePharma® 
 
Source: “World Preview 2015, Outlook to 2020” - EvaluatePharma® 
Exhibit 4 - Worldwide Prescription Drug & OTC Sales by EvaluatePharma® Therapy Area (2014 & 








Source: “World Preview 2015, Outlook to 2020” - EvaluatePharma® 
 




Exhibit 5a) – Shire’s Share Price ($) in 2014 and 2015 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Exhibit 6 – Shire’s Revenues FY 2015 and Last Patent Expiry Date 
 
Drug Name Year to December 31, 2015 $'M % of FY 2015 Sales Latest Patent Expiry  
Vyvanse 1722,2 28,2% 02/24/2023 
Lialda 684,4 11,2% 06/08/2020 
Cinryze 617,7 10,1% Expired 
Elaprase 552,6 9,1% 03/09/2019 
Firazyr 445,0 7,3% 07/15/2019 
Replagal 441,2 7,2% Expired 
Adderall xr 362,8 5,9% 04/21/2019 
Vpriv 342,4 5,6% Expired 
Pentasa 305,8 5,0% Expired 
Fosrenol 177,6 2,9% 12/01/2030 
Gattex 141,7 2,3% 11/01/2025 
Other product sales 116,2 1,9%  
Xagrid 100,8 1,7% Expired 
Intuniv 65,1 1,1% 01/04/2023 
Natpara 24,4 0,4% 01/12/2021 
Total Product Sales 6099,9    
Royalties 300,5    
Other Revenues 16,3    
Total Revenues 6416,7    
     
* Most of the drugs which patents have expired were granted the status of orphan drugs and benefited from a period of market exclusivity 
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Exhibit 7 – Shire’s Consolidated Balance sheet 2015 
 Dec 31, 2015 $'M Dec 31, 2014 $'M 
Assets      
Current assets:      
Cash and cash equivalents  135,5 2982,4 
Restricted cash 86 54,6 
Accounts receivable, net 1201,2 1035,1 
Inventories 635,4 544,8 
Deferred tax asset - 344,7 
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 197,4 221,5 
 Total current assets 2255,5 5183,1 
 Non-current assets:    
Investments 50,8 43,7 
Property, plant and equipment, net (“PP&E”) 828,1 837,5 
Goodwill 4147,8 2474,9 
Other intangible assets, net 9173,3 4934,4 
Deferred tax asset 121 112,1 
Other non-current assets 33,3 46,4 
Total assets 16609,8 13632,1 
Liabilities and equity       
Current liabilities:     
Accounts payable and accrued expenses 2050,6 1909,4 
Short-term borrowings 1511,5 850 
Other current liabilities 144 262,5 
Total current liabilities 3706,1 3021,9 
Non-current liabilities:    
Long-term borrowings 69,9 - 
Deferred tax liability  2205,9 1210,6 
Other non-current liabilities 798,8 736,7 
Total liabilities 6780,7 4969,2 
Commitments and contingencies   
Equity:    
Common stock of 5p par value; 1,000 million shares authorized; and 601.1 million shares issued 
and outstanding (2014: 1,000 million shares authorized; and 599.1 million shares issued and 
outstanding) 
58,9 58,7 
Additional paid-in capital 4486,3 4338 
Treasury stock: 9.7 million shares (2014: 10.6 million shares) -320,6 -345,9 
 Accumulated other comprehensive loss -183,8 -31,5 
Retained earnings 5788,3 4643,6 
Total equity 9829,1 8662,9 
Total liabilities and equity 16609,8 13632,1 
   
The accompanying notes are an integral part of these consolidated financial statements.  
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Exhibit 8 – Shire’s Income statement 2015 
Year to December 31, 2015 $'M 2014 $'M 
Revenues:      
Product sales 6099,9 5830,4 
Royalties 300,5 160,8 
Other revenues 16,3 30,9 
Total revenues 6416,7 6022,1 
Costs and expenses:      
Cost of product sales  969 979,3 
Research and development 1564 1067,5 
Selling, general and administrative 2341,2 2025,8 
Goodwill impairment charge - - 
Gain on sale of product rights -14,7 -88,2 
Reorganization costs 97,9 180,9 
Integration and acquisition costs 39,8 158,8 
Total operating expenses 4997,2 4324,1 
Operating income from continuing operations 1419,5 1698 
Interest income 4,2 24,7 
Interest expense -41,6 -30,8 
Other income/(expense), net 3,7 8,9 
Receipt of break fee - 1635,4 
Income from continuing operations before income taxes  and equity in (losses)/earnings of equity 
method investees 1385,8 3336,2 
Income taxes -46,1 -56,1 
Equity in (losses)/earnings of equity method investees, net of taxes -2,2 2,7 
Income from continuing operations, net of taxes 1337,5 3282,8 
(Loss)/gain from discontinued operations, net of taxes  -34,1 122,7 
Net income 1303,4 3405,5 
   
Earnings per ordinary share — basic      
Earnings from continuing operations 226,5¢ 559,6¢ 
(Loss)/gain from discontinued operations -5,8¢ 20,9¢ 
Earnings per ordinary share — basic 220,7¢ 580,5¢ 
Earnings per ordinary share — diluted     
Earnings from continuing operations 225,5¢ 555,2¢ 
(Loss)/gain from discontinued operations -5,8¢ 20,8¢ 
Earnings per ordinary share — diluted 219,7¢ 576,0¢ 
Weighted average number of shares (millions):      
Basic 590,4 586,7 
Diluted 593,1 591,3 
   
Research and development (“R&D”) includes IPR&D intangible asset impairment charges of $643.7 million for the year to December 31, 2015 (2014: 
$190.3 million). Selling, general and administrative (“SG&A”) costs property rights acquired of $498.7 million for the year to December 31, 2015 (2014: 
$243.8 million) include amortization of intangible assets relating to intellectual 
   
The accompanying notes are an integral part of these consolidated financial statements. 









Exhibit 9 – Baxalta’s FY 2015 Sales by Product and Geography  
Source:  Baxalta Annual Report 2015  
 
Exhibit 10 – Baxalta’s Enterprise Value 
In Millions of USD except Per Share FY 2014 FY 2015 
12 Months Ending 12/31/2014 12/31/2015 
Market Capitalization — 26 512,6 
  - Cash & Equivalents 0,0 1 001,0 
  + Preferred Equity 0,0 0,0 
  + Minority Interest 0,0 0,0 
  + Total Debt 551,0 5 268,0 
Enterprise Value — 30 779,6 
      
Total Capital 6 298,0 9 192,0 
Total Debt/Total Capital 8,75 57,31 
Total Debt/EV — 0,17 
      
EV/Sales — 5,01 
EV/EBITDA — 21,97 
EV/EBIT — 26,91 
EV/Cash Flow to Firm — 36,71 
      
Diluted Market Cap — 26 657,5 
Diluted Enterprise Value — 30 924,5 
Periodic EV to Shares Outstanding — 45,31 
      
Reference Items     
Trailing 12 Month Values for Ratios     
Sales 5 952,0 6 148,0 
EBITDA 1 842,0 1 401,0 
EBIT 1 636,0 1 144,0 
Cash Flow To Firm 1 373,0 838,5 
Free Cash Flow To Firm 403,0 -377,5 
Source: Bloomberg     
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Exhibit 11 – Top M&A Deals of 2015 in Terms of Total Value 
Acquirer Target Total Value ($'B) % in cash Value/share $ Premium EV/EBITDA 
Pfizer Allergan 160,00 0% 363,63 16% 21,4x 
Teva Pharmaceutical Ind. Allergan - Global Generics 40,50 83% - - 16,5x 
Abbvie Pharmacyclics 20,80 58% 261,25 39% 15,3x 
Pfizer Hospira 16,80 100% 90 42% 23.2x 
Danaher Pall 13,80 100% 127,20 28% 16,2 
Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int. Salix Pharmaceuticals 15,80 90% 173,00 44% 34x 
Alexion Pharmeceuticals Synageva 8,40 50% 230,00 140% NM 
Par Pharmaceutical Pharma Endo Int. 8,05 81% - - 11x 
Celgene Receptos 7,20 100% 232,00 12% NM 
Shire Dyax 5,90 100% 37,30 35% NM 
Shire NPS Pharmaceuticals 5,20 100% 46,00 51% NM 
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Shire + Baxalta 
New global leadership in the rare disease sector? 
 -Teaching Note 
Summary of the case 
Shire Plc is a Dublin-headquartered biopharmaceutical company founded in 1986 by four Irish 
man, with the purpose of finding the solution for unmet medical needs. The company has grown 
a lot through strategic acquisitions focusing mainly on its biggest therapy areas in terms of sales 
- Neuroscience and LDSs – and registering sales of $6,1 billion in the FY of 2015. Baxalta is an 
American-based biopharmaceutical company that resulted from the spinoff of the biosciences 
division of Baxter International on the 1st of July 2015. The company markets innovative 
biopharmaceuticals in the therapy areas of hematology, immunology and Oncology. In the FY of 
2015, the company’s sales amounted for a total of $6,2 billion. 
On the July 10th 2015, Shire made a $30B offer to acquire Baxalta in an all-stock transaction, in 
which shareholders would receive 0,1687 ADS’s (American Depositary Shares) for each 
Baxalta’s share owned, implying a payment of $45,23/share and a premium of 36% over the price 
of Baxalta’s shares as of 3 August, 2015, the day prior to the public announcement of the offer. 
With the combination with the global company, Shire intended to become the new global leader 
of the rare diseases. It was predicted that the combined company would have double-digit top-
line growth, substantial operating synergies ($500 million within the first three years after the 
deal is closed), ~$20 billion on product sales and more than 30 new products launched by 2020. 
Although Shire’s management considered this to be a very attractive offer, the CEO of Baxalta, 
Ludwig N. Hantson, saw it as an undervaluation of the firm he managed, rejecting it. 
In the beginning of 2016, the two companies still hadn’t reached an agreement, despite the 
attempted negotiations by Shire, who were convict the deal would be extremely positive for both 
firms. The Irish company was considering increasing the offer and paying some of it in cash to 
sweeten the deal for Baxalta. 
After 6 months of negotiations, in 11 January, 2016, Baxalta and Shire agreed on the terms of the 
acquisition, with Shire paying Baxalta’s shareholders a combination of $18 in cash and 0,1482 
Shire ADS’s for every Baxalta’s share, implying the payment of $47,50/share, a premium of 
37,5% over the price of Baxalta’s shares in August 3, 2015 and consequently valuing the 
biopharma company in $32 billion.  




The case of Shire + Baxalta refers to the attempt of a takeover and its negotiations, involving two 
large companies within the pharmaceutical industry between August 2015 and January 2016, in 
which the comprehension of the particularities of the industry itself and the way it operates are 
crucial to the understanding of the case.  
Through the case resolution, the concepts of organic and inorganic growth and its importance and 
impact in different situations and markets should be clarified. Students should be able to indicate 
the assets with the highest value in a company such as the one being acquired and the main drivers 
to go or not go through with this takeover from both sides of the negotiations table. 
The key issue of the case is the valuation of Baxalta. Students are oriented in a way to discover 
which of the possible different valuation approaches better fits the circumstances. The 
comprehension of real options and its complexity should be encouraged as well as the big 
limitations of the DCF approach in businesses that are so R&D intensive as the ones in the 
pharmaceutical industry. As a solution, students should use the multiples valuation method and 
use deals similar to the one being studied to understand the value that should be offered. The 
concept of synergy should also be deepened and accounted for whilst valuing the firm. 
The case is designed for the students to analyse the deal either from the buyer’s and the seller’s 
perspective, but the biggest decision forces them to think strategically and take the place of the 
buyer’s Management Team. 
Possible Poll Questions 
1. Which are the biggest strengths and risks Shire and Baxalta face considering the industry 
and sector where they are positioned and the conjuncture of the past few years? 
2. What is the role that inorganic (and organic) growth plays in the development of the 
pharmaceutical industry? Does the “Patent Cliff” influence the importance of inorganic 
growth? 
3. Is a company with a track of successfull acquisitions better qualified to do a new one than 
a company with no experience? What about the case of Shire and Baxalta? Did the 
previous deals prepare Shire for this acquisition? 
4. Does Baxalta have the right strategic fit for Shire?  
5. Why is the valuation of pharmaceutical companies so uncertain? Which are the most 
significant factors that contribute to that? Why does a pure DCF approach underestimate 
the true potential of the firm? How can the true value be calculated? 
6. What is the sealing price Shire should offer to Baxalta’s shareholders according to the 
Multiples method? And which is the implied premium payed? Is it appropriate? 
7. What should Flemming and his team decide regarding the purchase of Baxalta? 
  





1. Which are the biggest strengths and risks Shire and Baxalta face considering the 
industry and sector where they are positioned and the conjuncture of the past few 
years? 
 
Both Shire and Baxalta are companies operating in the pharmaceutic industry and in the rare 
disease sector. This makes some of their strengths and risks to be similar but the fact that they are 
specialized in different therapy areas, gives them unique characteristics that should be analysed. 
Both companies have strong characteristics that make them succeed. To begin with, it is important 
to highlight a couple of strengths which are intrinsic to the market itself. Both companies are 
positioned in a market which is not too exploited by their competitors and that gives them room 
to grow and discover completely new treatments in a way that would not be possible in a stable 
and saturated market with fierce competition. This market allows the companies to deal with less 
competition (although the number of competitors is growing quite fast) and price their new 
products higher and with higher margins than most markets would. Moreover, they can “easily” 
be pioneers in the treatment of certain diseases, gaining the trust and loyalty of the patients and 
establishing a strong position in the market with the launch of fewer drugs than it would usually 
be needed.  
And if one analyses each of the companies in particular, they will find that they have 
characteristics that make them unique: Shire is focused on the therapy areas of neuroscience, 
LSDs, GI/Endocrine, HAE and is investing in ophthalmic. The new drug in the ophthalmic area 
developed by the company, Lifitegrast, is subject to regulatory approval, and its approval is 
expected to be very beneficial for the company, with sales reaching $700 million by 2020. 
Moreover, the firm keeps expanding and diversifying its portfolio with successful strategic 
acquisitions, consolidating its position in the market. Additionally, the report for the 3Q of 2015, 
show the company exceeded the expectations for this period. Shire is also developing new drugs 
and expects to market around 10 new products by 2020. On the other hand, the biggest strengths 
of Baxalta are its leading position in the hematology area, with ~50% market share in the 
hemophilia market, its emerging investment on oncology, with the acquisition of Oncaspar and 
the program to develop a treatment to pancreatic cancer, and the project for the launch of 20 new 
products by 2020 in the three therapy areas the firm focuses on. 
Regarding the risks these firms face, the same thing is verified: some are intrinsic to the market 
and other are company-specific. Firstly, in the business of selling drugs, companies always have 
the problem of expiring patents. When the patent on a product expires, the generics competition 
kicks in and the revenues of the branded product decrease substantially, which is obviously 
harmful for the company. Secondly, as in the previously mentioned problem, the risk of the large 
investment in R&D, is a risk that hurts every pharma company. Firms can spend huge amounts 
of money trying to discover the treatment for a specific disease and, after all the hard work and 
investment, still be left with nothing either because the drug had too many problems to be worth 
further investment or because de FDA didn’t approve it. 
Summing up to the aforementioned risks it is important to highlight the fact that Shire was a target 
of an attempted acquisition by AbbVie, a deal which ended up not happening due to matters with 
the US tax laws, but still shows that the company can be in a situation of “buy big or be bought”, 
increasing the pressure to make a purchase. Baxalta presents a different risk given that its revenues 
are very dependent of the hematology drugs, which account for almost 60% of its total. This 
presents a risk for the company as the competition in this market is increasing and that can be 
harmful for the American company’s sales. 
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2. What is the role that inorganic (and organic) growth plays in the development of the 
pharmaceutical industry? Does the “Patent Cliff” influence the importance of 
inorganic growth? 
 
The first thing needed to answer this question is to clarify the concepts and differences of organic 
and inorganic growth. Organic growth refers to the internal growth of the company, obtained by 
increasing output and enhancing sales, whilst inorganic growth is the growth rate related with 
mergers and acquisitions.  
Is it always important to grow organically independently of the business or industry? Every 
company should work to optimize their operations to be able to increase their output with minimal 
increase in costs, expand in geography and product lines and reach as many clients as possible, 
achieving higher profits with internal change. This kind of growth confers the company a steady 
and stable long time growth, although it may take some time to achieve the results wanted. 
The particularities of the pharmaceutical industry give inorganic growth a higher importance than 
usual. This importance is even further enhanced in conjunctures as the one the industry is going 
through with the phenomenon known as Patent Cliff. The Patent Cliff refers to the mass expiration 
of patents that has been occurring in the past few years. It allow the generic products to be 
launched and has big consequences in the revenues of the big firms that lost product exclusivity. 
These companies feel the need to develop and market a large amount of new drugs in a short 
amount of time and with lower capital (result of the decrease in revenues), which is nearly 
impossible to accomplish without recurring to inorganic growth. Thus, companies need to 
conjugate their own R&D with the outsourcing of some of the first and most risky stages of 
development and with the acquisition of entire companies or segments of companies with their 
products, pipeline and new drugs development. 
The inorganic growth allows the company to grow faster in the short term with the acquisition or 
the merger, to reduce the risk of discovering and developing drugs from scratch, because the 
acquired companies have products that were already approved or are in different stages of 
approval, and even to mitigate the risk of entering a new market in which the firm has no 
knowledge whatsoever, if the acquired company has already established itself and gained 
experience on such market. Opposite to that, this type of growth also carries some risks such as 
the risk of the integration process not going as planned and the possibility of losing the know-
how with the key employees abandoning the company, or even the risk the synergies that were 
actually realized after the acquisition may not correspond to the predicted synergies before the 
deal, resulting in lower values of cost savings or sales improvement than expected, and implying 
an overvaluation of the target company. 
 
3. Is a company with a track of successful acquisitions better qualified to do a new one than 
a company with no experience? What about in the case of Shire and Baxalta? Did the 
previous deals prepare Shire for this acquisition? 
 
An acquisition is constituted by a number of steps and, for each one, different skills and 
knowledge are necessary. The steps of an acquisition will be roughly described to clarify the 
process: the acquisition begins with the development of an acquisition strategy followed by the 
process of searching and choosing the right company to combine with, and this is really a crucial 
step for the entire process because if you fail here, everything else is basically worthless. After 
that comes the valuation, the offer to the target company, negotiations and the due diligence 
process. If the deal is successful, after closing and setting the financing strategy, the final step, 
integration process of the acquired company, begins. Each of these steps plays a vital role in 
guaranteeing the success of an acquisition. 
A study made by The Boston Consulting Group (BCG)1 shows “acquisitions more often than not 
destroy value” and, when asked to corporate leaders why did the acquisitions failed to create the 
expected value, the reasons mainly fall into three categories: “poor deal preparation and execution 
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(including target selection and strategic fit); inadequate PMI; and bad market timing”. The three 
key takeaways that BCG considered every company should take in consideration when acquiring 
are: “cast a wide net, but prepare to seize opportunity; effective PMI is imperative; and timing 
and communication matter”. Let’s consider these three important categories to understand if the 
experience with previous acquisitions can or not, be valuable. 
The first takeaway to consider is “cast a wide net, but prepare to seize opportunity”. This relates 
to the beginning steps of the process like the M&A strategy, the search of a target and the final 
choice. The recommendations for BCG for the problems within these steps of the process are that 
the acquirer should analyse the industry and its trends, they should have an M&A strategy before 
starting the search for a target, and that the search should be rigorous, without shortcuts, 
embedded in the process of the organization, for future screening processes, but still flexible 
enough so that the firm can take an opportunistic and fast step when one presents itself. With this 
type of issues, an experienced company in terms of M&A deals would have a clear advantage 
over a first-timer. All of these recommendations are perfected over time and get more clear and 
systematic with repetition. 
Moving on to the second takeaway, effective PMI (post-merger integration) is imperative. One of 
the most common problems with an acquisition is the after closing integration. It needs to be fast 
(shareholders expect cost cutting synergies within 12 to 36 months after the deal is signed), to 
maintain day-to-day cash flows and to change the culture, habits and norms of one or both 
companies all at once, which is obviously a very difficult task for managers. According to BCG, 
deals done by “one-timers” (with only one acquisition in the last five years) only deliver an 
average relative total shareholder return (RTSR) of 2%, and only 43% of these deals generate 
positive shareholder returns. The numbers for more frequent buyers are higher and vary between 
6-8% RTSR and 51-56% of positive shareholder returns’ generation. The study shows that “one-
timers” are most likely to underestimate the challenges of PMI and to overestimate the synergies, 
whilst more experienced buyers are more likely to understand and have high incentives to 
overcome the obstacles of this difficult step. 
Lastly, timing and communication matter. The best time for an acquisition is when the economic 
growth and the volatility of the market are low. This is the time when the return is higher. In times 
when the growth is high, the deal often fail to have positive returns. This doesn’t seem to depend 
much on the experience of the buyer rather than on its attention to the macro environment. A 
completely different subject is to talk about communication. This is entirely a responsibility of 
the management team and can make a major difference to the well-being of the company in an 
M&A deal. The thing is that capital market hate surprises thus, regular and transparent 
communication between managers and shareholders is very important. One very important thing 
is to manage the expectations of the investors about the synergies the combination of the 
companies can generate, because if the expectations are too high, they are impossible to meet. 
The best practices are to show a bit of a background to demonstrate the deal makes sense, explain 
the rationale takes in consideration the macro economic conditions and the company is a good 
strategic fit for them, and finally disclose conservative values of the synergies to be obtained by 
the combination. 
Considering everything, it is safe to say that, generally speaking, an experienced company is much 
more like to make a successful M&A deal than a one timer. But what about cases like the one of 
Shire’s acquisition of Baxalta in which the value of the offer is as big as the sum of all the other 
acquisitions of the company? What if the deal is as different as this one is from the previous ones? 
In this case, although Shire still has some advantage from its previous deals, and it is of great 
value when selecting the target, negotiating, choosing the right time and even when it comes to 
the communication skills, its biggest “loss” is when it comes to the PMI, in that matter, the 
company is not prepared at all for this kind of acquisition from its previous ones. The thing is 
integrating a small company with a few hundreds of workers and a handful of ongoing projects 
and marketed drugs is completely different from integrating one with 16.000 employees and a 
large number of ongoing projects and drugs in the market. It is clear that, in a case like this, Shire 
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will have the need to learn from scratch what the best practices are and what is needed to 
successfully integrate Baxalta if the deal is closed. 
 
4. Does Baxalta have the right strategic fit for Shire? 
 
According to Barclays, if the offer is up to $55/shr of Baxalta, the deal makes sense for Shire, and 
according to the Bloomberg Gadfly columnist Brooke Sutherland2, a deal between $46,50 and 
$48 per share, is attractive enough for Baxalta to accept and low enough to keep the possibility 
of earnings accretion for Shire in 2017. But what if we look beyond the pure mathematical side 
of the price matter and evaluate the combination between both companies? Does it still make 
sense or is it too risky for Shire? This is actually not a simple question at all, given that even the 
analysts and investors fail to agree on it. The truth is, whilst analysts like Jason Gerberry said it 
was “a good strategic fit and financially attractive”, the actions of investors showed they are not 
so sure about that – after the announcement of Shire’s offer (4 August 2015), Shire’s shares fell 
4% to £55. 
When trying to answer this question, it is essential to look at the positive and the negative aspects 
that can come out of the combination. In the upside, it is easy to see some of the benefits this 
union would have: the creation of the global leading company on rare diseases, the reduction of 
taxes, the potential synergies that can be exploited, which would produce substantial cost savings 
and enhance the product lines and company growth in a way the firms wouldn’t reach on their 
own (Baxalta alone, was planning the launch of 20 new products before 2020), and the creation 
of value for both company’s shareholders. Shire’s shareholders can see their company grow faster, 
diversify its portfolio and enhance its cash flows. In the other side, Baxalta’s shareholders benefit 
from an immediate premium over the shares owned, and the possibility of faster growth and 
diversification. 
The bet on two strong therapy areas in the rare disease sector is a strategic option in the path to 
become the leader in the market, and surely will bring benefits to the combined company but, the 
bet on oncology is also a very important part of this deal, as this therapy area is expected to 
increase its market share within the worldwide pharmaceutical market and to have an even higher 
increase in sales. This means that a bet in this area may be very profitable in the years ahead. 
But it would not be clever to consider the benefits without taking a good look at some of the 
biggest risks of the deal. The first thing to consider is the price: if we consider the purchase is in 
accordance with the projected value of around $48 per share, it is implied that the company is 
bought at roughly 6x its revenues of 2015, a value in line with the big companies sales in the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnological markets over the last decade, but Baxalta’s growth is slower 
than many of those target companies, which makes one  wonder if this deal looks a bit expensive 
and if there is no other better alternative for Shire. 
Another risk that is important to consider is that the growing competition in the hemophilia market 
can also create a problem, considering that around 45% of Baxalta’s earnings rely on the treatment 
of the blood disorder. The growing market and consequent growth in the number of competitors 
is obviously dangerous to the dominance of the firm in this therapy area. It’s thus important to 
diversify the portfolio in different practise areas, as Baxalta is doing with the bet on Oncology 
drugs. In reference to this problem, Baxalta is protecting themselves with the approval of new 
hemophilia medicine, and the diversification of the portfolio with oncology and immunology. 
Plus, the costumers are usually, not keen on changing when they are happy with the product, 
which is good for the American pharmaceutical. 
The last evident big risk is related to the size of Baxalta. With the combination of the companies, 
Shire will roughly triple the number of employees and increase the number of facilities, projects 
and drugs in the market immensely. This is something that can go either way: if the integration 
process go smoothly, the companies’ interests are aligned and the company adapts itself fast to 
this big boost, the benefits can be huge and it will definitely be proven to have been worth it. But, 
if things don’t go that well, this may create a major problem to Shire. The firm may lose valuable 
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human assets (usually one of the most important ones in areas where R&D has such a central 
role), it can jeopardize the synergies that could came from the combination and can even lose 
focus on their operations due to the resources and management’s focus on the integration, hurting 
its own cash flows. 
To sum up, given the big amount of advantages this deal can bring to Shire, if the two biggest 
“red flags” are controlled - the price offered kept at a reasonable value, the protection of the 
leading position in the hemophilia drug market, the strong bet in growing markets as oncology 
and the elaboration and implementation of a very strong integration process, Baxalta is a good 
strategic fit for Shire, considering the short and long term goals Shire is aiming for. 
 
5. Why is the valuation of pharmaceutical companies so uncertain? Which are the most 
significant factors that contribute to that? Why does a pure DCF approach 
underestimate the true potential of the firm? How can the true value be calculated?  
 
The valuation of the company is the most important factor when accessing the fairness of any 
offer, but it can also be a very tricky process, especially in industries like the pharmaceutical, in 
which most of the value of the each firm is in the products that are yet to be developed. The 
expiration of patents and the uncertainty of the products to be marketed in the future, make the 
valuation of pharma companies very hard to determine. The trends in this industry are not only 
hard to estimate but even harder to meet, as the product development duration and success is 
extremely uncertain. Moreover, in case a competitor company reaches technological advances or 
breakthrough methodologies, to which the firm does not have access, it can be very hard to keep 
up with the cadence of the launching of new products, as the processes become obsolete and, 
consequently very time and cost consuming. 
In companies as Baxalta, a lot of factors must be taken into consideration so that its valuation is 
as accurate as possible. One needs to consider the existent assets, such as the facilities and the 
marketed products (taking into account the patents that will expire), but also the drugs that are 
being developed and tested by the R&D teams (accounting for the ones that will succeed, the ones 
that will fail, and even the ones that will actually be marketed but not with the purpose that they 
were being created for). This means that, using the traditional DCF methodology, the value of the 
firm would be underestimated. The real value of the undeveloped drugs can be estimated using a 
methodology based on options similar to the financial options, but with an adjusted application 
of the Black and Scholes model to value real options. The large number of factors that need to be 
considered, make the valuation of a pharma company, a very complex process, especially when 
relying on these valuation methods. 
An alternative valuation method is the use of multiples, comparing Baxalta with similar 
companies (comparable companies) in terms of size, industry, markets and geography. The choice 
of the comparable companies is extremely important given that this industry has values that 
cannot be compared with the rest of the market (for example a higher price-to-earnings ratio due 
to the R&D costs of a drug being paid a long time before the drug starts producing revenues) and 
because any big disparities between companies, even within the same industry, may result 
naturally in very different ratios, without them having any relation to the relative performance of 
the companies. This method uses equity or enterprise multiples as PE or EV/EBITDA from the 
selected comparable companies to compute a market multiple and, finally, multiply it with the 
measure of the target company to obtain its equity or market value respectively.  
  
6. What is the sealing price Shire should offer to Baxalta’s shareholders according to the 
Multiples method? And which is the implied premium payed? Is it appropriate? 
 
Although the valuation method, as described, would be a good one to value the target companies 
as Baxalta, it is still not accurate enough. This valuation does not consider the premium that 
should be payed to the acquired company’s shareholders, it only accounts for the estimated 
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company’s market value. To understand the true value one should offer to acquire a target 
company is to use multiples of other recent and similar acquisitions. Through these multiples, the 
buyer company can have a real sense of how much the market is paying in acquisitions as the one 
they intend to do, already considering the synergies and negotiation levers. 
The deals used to reach a “market multiple” were the biggest deals of 2015, because in an industry 
as volatile as the pharmaceutical and the biotechnological, it is very important to have in mind 
that the multiples of acquisitions made a couple of years ago may be very different from the ones 
practiced today. Besides, in terms of size, given that the deal of Shire and Baxalta’s revolves 
around $30 billion, one of the biggest deals of the year, it would not be appropriate to compare it 
with very small deals.  
After the selection of the companies to use, it becomes necessary to choose the most appropriate 
multiple to use in this specific industry. EV/EBITDA is one of the most used multiples in the 
valuation of companies for takeovers, especially for capital intensive businesses like the 
pharmaceutical ones, amongst other reasons because it is less sensitive to the capital structure and 
can, thus, be used to compare companies with different debt levels. In theory, a valuation with a 
lower multiple than the market one is underestimated and one with one higher than the average is 
overestimated. High growth industries such as the one in study are expected to have a very high 
EV/EBITDA multiple. The table with the companies and their EV/EBITDA multiples is 
presented in exhibit x and an average was computed (excluding the outliers) to reach a market 
multiple of 18,3x. The value offered and rejected in the previous August was around $30 billion 
($33,9 billion including debt), which implies a EV/EBITDA of 15x (considering the last twelve 
months EBITDA as of March 31, 2015). A 15x multiple is considerably below the market, 
indicating the value of the offer can be increased and still be a good deal for Shire. If the 17,3x 
multiple is applied to the EBITDA of Baxalta, the total value, including debt, is of $39 billion and 
the value payed is $35,2 billion. This is, in theory, the highest value Shire should offer to Baxalta 
and it would imply a premium of 45% over Baxalta’s share price on August 3, 2015, indicating 
this price is may be a little too high, given that the average premium in 2015 pharmaceutical deals 
was 39%. If the average premium was applied, the EV would be of $34,6 billion and the 
EV/EBITDA of 15.3x but, as it has already been established, this is an industry where every 
specificity can have a big weight on the value of a company and for that reason, every deal needs 
to take into account as many of the specificities as possible. 
For that, it is important to consider the predicted quantifiable benefits that will come of this 
purchase to know how much to pay for Baxalta. The combined company is expected to have ~$5 
billion incremental sales until 2020 and to carry out more than $500 million in cost-cutting within 
the first 3 years after closing the deal. 
On the 11th of January, 2016 both companies agreed on the deal terms, with Baxalta’s shareholders 
receiving $47,50/share, a premium of 37,5% over the price of Baxalta’s shares in August 3, 2015. 
The price payed per share implied a transaction of $32 billion, a value that corresponds to an 
EV/EBITDA of 16x, quite bellow the market average. 
 
7. What should Flemming and his team decide regarding the purchase of Baxalta? 
 
According to the analyses made throughout this case, it is concluded that companies in this 
industry and conjuncture have the need to grow, entering new markets and strengthening their 
positions in market they already operate through M&A deals. Considering this need and the 
strategy Flemming wants to employ of becoming the global leader in the rare disease sector, and 
being aware of the strength and weaknesses/risks of both companies Baxalta is indeed a go 
candidate for the next deal of the company. 
Considering then Baxalta as the target to get, and concluding that Shire should not give up easily 
on the American company, it is very important to make sure Shire is prepared to handle the 
takeover in the best way possible. This means Shire should be aware of the difficulties and 
obstacles they are to have in the concretization of the predicted synergies, and have a plan to 
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positively integrate Baxalta after the merger to mitigate as much as possible the risk of destroying 
value with the acquisition instead of creating value with it. 
The last important thing to be decided by Flemming and his team is the new offer to present. It 
was concluded that the offer should not be higher than $38 billion including debt, which 
corresponds to a value of $51,4 per share, with a premium of 55% over the value of August 3, 
2015, and with an implied EV/EBITDA of 16,8x and the offer can be sweetened by the alteration 
in the way of payment, adding cash to the offer. The problem here is the tax burden that may arise 
from the cash payment, given the status of recently spun-off company that Baxalta has. Thus, 
Flemming should have legal and fiscal advice on the consequences of different amount of cash in 
the offer and act according to it, offering a percentage of cash per share that is very attractive to 
the shareholders and that doesn’t create tax problems to the company.  
The actual amount payed in cash was $18 per share, corresponding to around 38% of the total 
payment of $47,50/share. This value was found to not create a tax burned associated with the cash 




1 - Jens Kengelbach, G. K. (2015, October 12). From Acquiring Growth to Growing Value. 
bcg.perpectives. 
2 - Sutherland, B. (2016, January 4). Is Baxalta Just Right For Shire? BloombergGadfly. 
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Exhibits – Teaching Note 
 
Exhibit TN-1 – Top M&A Deals of 2015 in Terms of Total Value and Average Premium and 
Multiple 
 
Acquirer Target Total Value ($'B) % in cash Value/share $ Premium EV/EBITDA 
Pfizer Allergan 160,00 0% 363,63 16% 21,4x 
Teva Pharmaceutical Ind. Allergan - Global Generics 40,50 83% - - 16,5x 
Abbvie Pharmacyclics 20,80 58% 261,25 39% 15,3x 
Pfizer Hospira 16,80 100% 90 42% 23.2x 
Danaher Pall 13,80 100% 127,20 28% 16,2 
Valeant Pharmaceuticals Int. Salix Pharmaceuticals 15,80 90% 173,00 44% 34x 
Alexion Pharmeceuticals Synageva 8,40 50% 230,00 140% NM 
Endo International Par Phamaceutical 8,05 81% - - 11x 
Celgene Receptos 7,20 100% 232,00 12% NM 
Shire Dyax 5,90 100% 37,30 35% NM 
Shire NPS Pharmaceuticals 5,20 100% 46,00 51% NM 
Average*     39% 17,3x 
       
* The average was computed without the outliers      
Source: Bloomberg and Companies Websites 
 
